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There is a debate among policy analysts about whether 
fuel taxes alone are the most effective policy to reduce 
fuel use by motorists, or whether to also use mandatory 
standards for fuel efficiency. A problem with a policy 
mandating fuel economy standards is the “rebound 
effect,” whereby owners with more efficient vehicles 
increase vehicle usage. If an important part of negative 
externalities from transport are associated with vehicle 
kilometers (accidents, congestion, road wear) rather than 
fuel consumption, the rebound effect increases negative 
externalities. Taxes and standards should be mutually 
supportive because fuel taxes often meet political 
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of a larger effort in the department to  mainstream research on climate change. Policy Research Working Papers are also 
posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at eske@cicero.uio.no.
resistance. Over time, fuel efficiency standards can 
reduce political resistance to fuel taxes. Thus, by raising 
fuel efficiency standards now, politicians may be able 
to pursue higher fuel tax paths in the future. Another 
argument in support of fuel efficiency standards and 
similar policies is that standards to a greater extent than 
taxes can be announced in advance and still be credible 
and change the behavior of inventors, firms, and other 
agents in society. A further argument is that standards 
can be used with greater force and commitment through 
international coordination. 
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 I.  Introduction  
Energy and energy consumption are a public policy issue for many reasons.  One reason is 
that there are negative externalities related to energy consumption (such as emissions of 
local air pollutants or global greenhouse gases). Policy instruments to address such 
problems will to a great extent attempt to reduce fuel consumption even if they are not 
addressed with fuel taxes, as when one uses tradable quotas or emission taxes. To this 
extent the arguments here apply. Another is that energy consumption might be a sensible 
and practical way of charging for some public service, like provision of road space, to limit 
congestion and accidents, etc.  A third reason is that government may be concerned that 
scenarios of energy shortage are given too little attention in private markets.  These types 
of issues give government reason to apply policy instruments to reduce energy 
consumption.  This paper examines the question of how to use efficiency standards and/or 
fuel taxes for such purposes, and uses the example of vehicular fuel use as the concrete 
model.   
 
This paper takes for granted that security of the energy supply and greenhouse gas 
emission reductions are major public goals that can underpin strategies to conserve 
petroleum use. Both of these goals have, from the perspective of the objectives themselves, 
important dimensions of time and uncertainty.  If the oil supply in the future becomes more 
costly, is the government currently playing a role in helping to reduce oil consumption now? 
Today’s world market prices could reflect future expected scarcity, and markets may also 
allow for valuation of scenarios that are less likely, and offer insurance.  Similarly, for 
greenhouse gas emissions, should one take steps towards conservation now, under the 
belief that emission costs in the future will be high? The present study accepts that the 
answer to both questions could be yes.  First, current prices may not fully reflect future 
scarcity, and the issue of insurance may be different between a country or a group of 
countries and (smaller) individual agents
2.  Second, in particular through their effect on 
                                                 
2 Hotelling’s famous model for exhaustible resources imply that oil prices should increase with the real rate 
of interest, making oil savings at any time worth the same ex ante.  But assumptions are important, and 
exhaustible resources could be harvested more like open access fisheries, with present prices too low to 
reflect future scarcity.  For Carbon dioxide emissions, more obviously than for oil, a property rights regime 
has not been established generally and firmly, and low emission prices applying in many contexts likely fail 
to express expected future scarcity premia.   
  2capital decisions, such as car efficiency and related research, present policies may change 
our future ability to deal with energy scarcity and/or emission reduction requirements.   
 
From the basic welfare economics point of view, it appears as if fuel efficiency standards 
are not required if externalities relate to fuel consumption.  A fuel tax asks consumers to 
reduce fuel consumption by optimally combining reduced demand for the energy service 
(vehicle miles) and improved fuel efficiency.   Therefore the government would have little 
reason to make use of a fuel efficiency standard, which singles out improved fuel 
efficiency as a solution.  Arguments in favor of the efficiency standard could be that 
producers or consumers fail to focus sufficiently on fuel efficiency improvements due to 
how expectations are formed or how the future is discounted, and thus we shall allow these 
considerations as we discuss the case for combinations of standards and taxes.   
 
The improvements in fuel efficiency that follow from either fuel taxes or fuel efficiency 
standards include technological change, which may be far-reaching and radical depending 
on the general policy setting.  Currently we deal with this question in a very basic way by 
simply assuming that producers can make cars more efficient for a cost, in response to 
these two instruments.  Technological change responds to many factors (most of which we 
abstract from), an important one being expectations.  Since expected fuel prices is a 
question of importance for technological change, we address the question of whether fuel 
economy standards could affect expectations and technological change differently than fuel 
taxes and announcements about future fuel taxes.
3  
 
Oil price shocks beginning in the 1970s left negative and memorable consequences for 
importing countries forcing them to seek ways to reduce their dependency on imported oil.  
Reducing energy dependency became an important policy objective of the United States, 
the European Union, and a host of other countries.  Many countries have opted to diversify 
                                                 
3Apart from these narrow questions regarding these two instruments, technological change is not dealt with 
in this paper.   
  3their energy portfolios and reduce reliance on imported oil.  Through the 1980s and 1990s, 
concerns declined
4.  Dependency was lower, and so were oil prices.   
 
Taxes have kept prices from dropping for products such as gasoline and diesel in many 
countries.  In some cases this has been in lieu of environmental objectives and road user 
charges, however equally as important are the general fiscal objectives.  In the past couple 
of decades, a consensus has been building among scientists that consumption of fuel, more 
specifically the release of anthropogenic carbon dioxide to the atmosphere, has been the 
primary factor behind the increase in temperature and climate change.  Responsible 
policies required countries to once again reduce consumption of fossil fuel for dual 
purposes of energy supply security and greenhouse gas emission reductions.   
 
Reducing carbon dioxide emissions and enhancing energy security have been the primary 
factors driving countries to reduce their oil consumption.  Most countries throughout the 
world (though there are exceptions among oil exporting countries) take some measures to 
conserve energy through gasoline taxes and/or mandated increases in fuel efficiency 
standards.   
 
Across the world, there are alternative policies in place to help reduce gasoline 
consumption (See, among others, Schipper et al, 1999).  Policy makers in the United States, 
the European Union, China, etc. use both mandated fuel efficiency standards as well as 
fuel taxes
5.  One important argument in favor of fuel efficiency standards is based on the 
assumption that car buyers, and private individuals in particular, care very little about 
future savings in fuel consumption.  In economists’ terms, people discount the benefit from 
expected fuel savings at a higher rate than what is socially optimal.  If they do, they do not 
offer car makers enough of a premium for more efficient cars, thus car makers and 
inventors have suboptimal incentives to build (and invent) more efficient cars.  This 
                                                 
4 In fact, according to IEA data, in OECD, government research on energy technology almost halved between 
1985 and 2000 (Alfsen and Eskeland, 2007). 
5 We shall use the term fuel taxes, in part because our point is a general one about a variable input with 
negative external effects, and due to the illustration we make about vehicles and transport, we should think 
about ‘fuel’ as gasoline and diesel.  The terms ‘car’ and ‘vehicles’ carry the more general meaning of 
‘machine’.  The terms fuel economy standards and fuel efficiency standards are used interchangeably.   
  4question is an important one, and it is separate from the question of whether fuels are taxed 
so as to internalize the negative externalities due to fuel consumption.   
 
Many economists argue that a gasoline tax is an effective policy instrument if the objective 
is to reduce gasoline consumption, and that when fuel taxes are used, there is no need for 
fuel efficiency standards.  It could very well be, of course, that consumers discount future 
fuel savings ‘too heavily’ because they are financially constrained.  Without this, justifying 
government intervening with fuel economy standards to force consumers to buy cars that 
are more efficient (and, by assumption, either more expensive or less interesting in one 
quality dimension or another) is difficult.   
 
We argue that the ‘competition’ between fuel economy standards and fuel taxes is falsely 
created in the literature. Representative views in the literature are reflected by Crandall 
(1992): “As a practical matter, the current policy choice for reducing fuel consumption or 
carbon emissions is between CAFE and fuel tax” or CBO (2004) “This issue briefly 
focuses on the economic costs of CAFE standards and compares them with the costs of a 
gasoline tax that would reduce gasoline consumption by the same amount.”  We shall 
argue here, in contrast, that mandated standards are compliments, to be used together. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section III presents a review of the 
literature following a historical overview in section II of mandated increases in the fuel 
economy. In section IV, a simple model is presented as to analyze the joint use of the two 
policies.  General implications are drawn from the models and we conclude the paper with 
some final remarks.   
II.  Brief History of Standards  
The pattern of fuel economy standards and gas taxes are an important indicator of the 
policy process over time.  Fuel economy standards have increased over time just as 
gasoline taxes have in many countries.   
 
  5The 1973-74 oil embargoes and its consequence on oil prices have led United States policy 
makers to consider the automobile fuel efficiency within their economy.  According to 
Bamberger (2003), new cars’ average fuel economy, as measured by miles per gallon 
(MPG), had fallen from 14.8 in 1967 to 12.9 in 1974.  Thus, in 1975 the Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standard for passenger cars was enacted.  The program 
required manufacturers that sell more than 10,000 autos per year to comply with the 
mandated CAFE standards
6 or face a fine of $55 per car-MPG fine.
7. 
Figure1: Fuel Economy of New vehicles  
 
Source: Gerard and Lave (2003) 
 
The above figure illustrates the average fuel economy for passenger car’s and light duty 
trucks within the United States between 1975 through 2000.  Throughout this period, light 
duty trucks (which include vans and sport utility vehicles, SUVs) have been under more 
generous (lax) fuel standards than cars.  Their increased share in the market, which has 
reached 50% of total sales, is seen by the fact that the fleet’s total fuel economy is 
declining though within the two subcategories it has been fairly stable since the mid-1980s.   
 
                                                 
6 See Kleit (2004).   
7 Economists will appreciate the feature that cars can be sold that are more or less efficient than the standard, 
as long as the average complies with the standard. Corporations that sell mostly luxury cars have not had the 
benefit of this averaging, facing a barrier that probably combines politics and administrative feasibility.   
  6As noted by Crandall and Graham (1989), sky rocketing oil prices, partly caused by the 
Iranian revolution, had provided sufficient incentives for automobile producers to improve 
their fuel economy standards, so that  all three of the major United States car producers 
exceeded the mandates by wide margins.  However, the decline in oil price in 1981 lead to 
decreasing fuel efficiency, and the mandated fuel economy standards again became 
binding.   
 
Countries have different fuel economy standards.  An and Sauer (2004) reported that 
increasingly many countries have raised the fuel economy standard over time.  By and 
large, Japan has the highest fuel economy standards compared to the rest of the world.  The 
United States has the lowest, along with Canada, Australia and China, all of which have 
lower (i.e. more lax) standards than the European Union (figure 2)
8.  Figure 2 also displays 
an important feature of fuel economy standards:  they may develop over time according to 
a preannounced schedule.  If automakers can be made to believe that the schedule will be 
implemented and enforced, then the credibility of such a plan may imply that these 
standards have an edge over fuel taxes in terms of sending longer term signals, and thus 
more powerful incentives to invest and innovate. 
 
On average, the United States’ federal gas tax rates have been increasing, except for the 
decline in the late 1980s.  Federal taxes have initially been levied for revenue generating 
reasons.  However, increasing recognition of the negative externalities associated with gas 
provided additional rationale for taxing gasoline.   
 
Practical illustration shows that fuel taxes and standards often work together, rather than as 
competing instruments.  From the mid–1980s, in the United States, we have seen that both 
have increased (not shown)
9.  As long as mandated fuel economy standards and gas tax 
rates are ‘discretely’ chosen by policy makers, policy makers have been using both 
instruments as compliments to each other instead of an alternative to each other.   The fact 
that almost all research focuses on the comparison between technology standards and gas 
                                                 
8 see also Zachariadis (2006) 
9 According to CBO (2003) federal gasoline tax started in 1932.  United States gas taxes are low by 
international standards, see Parry and Small (2005). 
  7tax is somewhat paradoxical given how fuel economy standards are used in many countries, 
including Australia, Canada, China, Japan, the United States and the European Union. 
 
Figure 2: Comparison of Fuel Economy Standards across Countries 
 
Source: An and Sauer (2004). 
 
The Challenges Ahead 
As incomes grow, car ownership rates can safely be expected to expand. Moreover, since 
space at home and in the workplace are normal goods, urban densities will decline, unless 
changes in prices and other conditions counter this trend.
10.  This puts great demands on 
investment in transport infrastructure, makes it increasingly costly to defend or expand the 
share of public transport, and to manage externalities due transport.  As a result, the policy 
objectives of greenhouse gas emission reductions and of energy security results in a need 
for long term management of fossil fuel use in transport, perhaps by using policy 
                                                 
10 See Alain Bertaud and Stephen Malpezzi (2003).  Transport is generally found to be a normal good.  
Private cars often are luxury goods (in the narrow sense of income elasticities exceeding one) at least at low 
to moderate income levels, and – then – so is travel by personal vehicles.   
  8instruments such as energy efficiency standards in addition to instruments such as 
gasoline and diesel taxes. 
 
In general, private cars are normal goods in the sense that car ownership rates are 
increasing with income, as is the use of private cars. In addition, people (or nations) tend 
to buy less fuel efficient cars at higher income levels (illustrations of these stylized facts 
are given in annex figures A1 through A7, merely meant to illustrate empirical 
associations, rather than implying causality).  The explanation for this phenomenon is 
typically found in the fact that income growth allows people to seek other quality 
dimensions in cars, and that these may correlate with low fuel efficiency. Cars with more 
space, acceleration, carrying capacity and comfort may be – ceteris paribus – also less fuel 
efficient. Such a pattern is illustrated in the data by showing that the average weight per 
car is higher in countries with higher average incomes. Finally, it is also found that people 
buy more efficient cars in countries with higher fuel prices. Thus, in broad, cross-country 
averages, presumptions along the lines of ‘homo economicus’ are not contradicted.  
 
In sum, when population and incomes grow, there will be more and greater vehicles on the 
road, and in welfare terms this is of course an agreeable development. Such growth has, 
however, implications for fuel use, and the management of the externalities demands 
long-term perspectives.  
 
 
III. Review of the Literature 
 
There are two strands of research that has focused on fuel economy standards. One type of 
research has been geared towards understanding the relative merits of fuel economy 
standards relative to fuel taxes. The other strand, on the other hand, focused on the 
efficiency of standards in light of different market failures.
11 
                                                 
11Lower fuel consumption would make an the economy less dependent  on energy, and on trade with regions 
that might be politically unstable and some times very hostile to the US. In fact, the 1973-1974 Arab oil 
embargoes had been the main driving force for the 1975 fuel efficiency standard mandate. As concerns on 
  9 
Economics researchers have focused on whether mandated fuel economy standards or 
gasoline taxes are most suited to reduce gasoline consumption. The public policy issue is 
that greenhouse gas emissions as well as national oil dependence can be seen as unpriced 
consequences of fuel consumption, or negative externalities. These externalities in 
principle are best internalized with a fuel tax at the appropriate level, thus making the fuel 
user take these effects into account when consuming fuel. A fuel efficiency standard 
addresses fuel consumption in a less flexible, more constrained way, since it makes cars 
more fuel efficient, but fails to give incentives to drive less.  
 
Fuel efficiency standards are thus not the best instrument choice from basic principles, and 
arguments in their favor typically include a few twists with appeal from the real world.  
One twist is that consumers, and also auto manufacturers, fail to fully value the fuel 
savings that an efficient car offers for the future; due to myopia or other reasons (we deal 
with these issues below).  Another is that fuel taxes transfer money to governments in 
addition to internalizing the externality, and unless the transfer is seen as valuable to tax 
payers, fuel taxes will meet greater political resistance than standards (Parry et al, 2007, 
give a well rounded treatment, and the basic point was observed by Buchanan and Tullock, 
(1975)..   
 
Austin and Dinan (2005) and the CBO (2003) analyze the cost effectiveness of either 
raising CAFE standards or increasing the federal gasoline tax.  After careful analysis, both 
studies conclude that the current CAFÉ design is not cost effective when compared with 
the gas tax.   
 
Crandall (1992) and also Kleit (2004) document that the welfare costs of reducing 
consumption with fuel economy standards are higher than when comparable reductions are 
                                                                                                                                                    
climate change grow, lower fuel consumption  is intended also to reduce the emission of CO2 to the 
atmosphere.  
  
  10achieved with taxes.
12 This fits well with basic theory. It establishes that unless one 
accepts and incorporates effects such as myopia and excessive discounting, fuel efficiency 
standards will be a costly way of reducing consumption relative to fuel taxes. This is 
illustrated well by Fischer et al.(2007) who develop a general model to analyze increases in 
fuel economy standards, allowing for alternative assumptions about how consumers value 
fuel efficiency. Those assumptions allow tighter efficiency standards to bring anything 
from moderate welfare gains to substantial welfare losses, based on damage costs estimates 
from the USA (i.e. a cost benefit analysis, rather than comparison with tax).  
 
Gerard and Lave (2003), in contrast, argue that there is a huge gap between social and 
private willingness to pay for oil conservation.  The source of this mismatch is not due to 
lack of information or traditional sources of market failure as they argue that “…we argue 
that CAFE is justified even for rational, well-informed consumers, since there are social 
benefits of fuel conservation that private decision makers do not internalize.”  
 
One argument in favor of a mandated increase in fuel efficiency concerns a particular 
aspect of household decisions, perhaps to be regarded as market failure.  These arguments 
(see National Academy of Sciences (1991), and Haussmann (1979)), are based on 
empirical studies indicating that low-income households use higher discount rates when 
they value future fuel savings. Accordingly, consumers discount the benefit of energy 
conservation at a higher rate than what a society would desire, and fuel economy standards 
can address this.
13   
 
Another argument for mandated fuel standards in relation to gasoline taxes concerns equity 
and public finance. According to this argument, uniform gasoline taxes are more painful to 
                                                 
12 See also Charles River Associates (1991) for details of the calculation of costs. 
13 The empirical estimate from Espey and Nair (2005) suggests that there are cases with no evidence of 
excessive discounting. Generally, the research testing the hypothesis of market failure through excessive 
discounting is not rich, neither providing clear results on the empirical phenomenon nor in terms of policy 
implications. 
 
  11the poor than to the rich, while fuel economy standards selectively penalize those who buy 
new cars only (in fact, David Harrison and others have pointed out, regulations that make 
new cars more expensive can give owners of old cars capital gains, though perhaps 
transitory). Nevertheless, while gasoline taxes transfer money from the private sector to 
government and this may be argued to be regressive, there are important counterarguments. 
First, there are compensatory ways to transfer money back to the private sector, including 
some that are better at targeting the poor than are gasoline subsidies. Second, there is an 
important insight from public finance that raising money for the public sector is costly, but 
worthwhile to analyze in a general equilibrium context. While ‘green taxes’ such as 
gasoline taxes may indeed provide opportunities for ‘double dividends’ (reduce pollution 
and raise revenue) the literature points to the importance of the pre-existing tax structure, 
and that a second dividend depends on exactly which other taxes are reduced when green 
taxes are increased (Goulder et al, 1999, Parry et al. 2007).   
 
A mandated increase in the fuel efficiency standard is a long run policy since they only 
apply to new vehicles entering the active fleet.  Over the long term, improvements in 
energy efficiency, such as through higher technology standards reduce the cost of trips 
through the reduction of fuel consumption.  As long as trips are not completely inelastic in 
demand (as long as the demand elasticity for trips is not zero), consumers respond to more 
efficient cars by raising their consumption of trips.  Therefore, everything else equal, a 
mandated increase in fuel efficiency raises the number of miles driven.  This effect is 
known as the rebound effect in the literature (see our model, below).  As a result of the 
decreased effect on the price of trips, or miles, one can thus see a rise in congestion and 
traffic fatalities, etc.  (CB, 2003), Fischer et al., 2007, Crandall and Graham, 1989, Noland 
2004)
14, as well as - potentially - a reduction in labor supply (West and Williams, 2005). 




                                                 
14 Yun (2002) argues this effect is weak 
  12IV.  A Simple Model of Fuel Efficiency and Demand 
 
Both car ownership and use are sensitive to pricing and thus gasoline taxes, diesel taxes, 
and car taxes.  Cars can be taxed both in terms of the purchase decision (Denmark and 
Norway have car taxes in excess of 100%), and thus people may buy different cars 
depending on tax levels and tax structure.  Norway applies taxes to cars increasing in their 
weight, horse powers, CO2 emissions and other parameters, and the United States applies 
both fuel efficiency standards (though with some unattractive consequences of poor 
design) and a gas guzzler tax for vehicles with the highest certified consumption per mile.   
 
It is well argued in the literature that the best way to limit the consumption of a 
commodity such as gasoline or diesel is with the price instrument and taxation
15.  In the 
following theoretical section, we carefully look into this argument, and also examine the 
consequences of fuel efficiency standards.  We shall retain unchallenged throughout the 
paper, the validity of the argument that fuel taxes are very important policy instruments, 
but recognize that additional instruments to fuel taxes may be desirable.  We examine the 
case for fuel efficiency standards in that context.  In brief, our arguments rest on fuel taxes 
and expected fuel taxes being lower than desirable from the perspective of a social planner 
(alternatively, producers and consumers fail to value sufficiently highly expected future 
fuel savings).  In these cases, fuel saving instruments, such as fuel efficiency standards or 
subsidies to Research and Development (R&D) are used as supplementary instruments.  
Their function is in part to reduce future average fuel dependency, thereby making lower 
fuel use and higher fuel taxes politically feasible and thus expected.  
 
We use the terminology of cars and fuel efficiency to illustrate, though the following 
arguments apply to capital equipment embodying energy use more generally
16.  The 
assumption is that there is a trade off between fixed costs and variable (energy) costs, 
                                                 
15  See for instance Portney (2002)’s report on the Academy of Sciences review of the fuel efficiency 
standards in the United States, and Charles River Associates, 1991. Eskeland and Feyzioglu, 1997, 
demonstrates that an attempt to reduce driving in Mexico with a rationing scheme proved not only to be 
costly as compared to a tax, but counterproductive. Affirming those results, see also Davis, 2008.  
16 There are different models in the literature: Goldberg (1998), Austin and Dinan (2005), Kleit (2004), 
Kwoka (1983) or Fischer, Harrington and Parry(2007). The one applied here generates the key results while 
remaining very simple.   
  13represented by a function  , where x is a quantity of energy services rendered 
through the use of the equipment.  In the case of cars, x is vehicle miles driven, q is 
gallons of gasoline, and k is capital.  In simple terms, we assume that with everything else 
equal, one can get more mileage out of the capital equipment by investing more.  We shall 
simplify further by assuming that the function f takes the form
) , ( k q f x =
) ( ) , ( k e q k q f ⋅ = , so that  
 
(1)  ,   ) (k e q x ⋅ =
 
Where e is fuel efficiency (in miles per gallon), and k is the cost of the car.  We assume 
that the derivative of efficiency with respect to k is positive,  and that its second 
derivative is nonnegative .  For the moment, we shall assume that the demand for 
miles driven, is given, so that we may view the decision maker (a consumer choosing 
what car to purchase, for instance) as minimizing costs given the miles the consumer 
wants to drive.  Let us assume that the costs of holding capital equipment k for a year are 
0 > k e
0 ≥ kk e
δ .  The parameter δ represents the sum of the discount rate and the depreciation of the 
capital equipment, so δ  could be 0.2 if the discount rate (or interest rate) is ten percent 
and the car is depreciated over ten years.  We may now write the consumer’s costs, where 
the cost of gasoline in dollars per gallon is the sum of the marginal cost of production and 
the gasoline tax, as 
 
(2)   k q t p k q c δ + + = ) ( ) , ( . 
  
The consumer’s problem can now be described as choosing q and k such as to minimize 
costs while making sure the consumer gets the desired miles.  Equivalently, we describe 
the consumer as maximizing services, or miles driven, for a given budget
17.  The 
Lagrangian of the consumer’s maximization problem can be written as: 
 
(3)   () ( ) [ ] q t p k t k e q L q k + + + − ⋅ = δ λ ) (  
 
                                                 
17 This form makes the transition easier when we later introduce a demand function.   
  14Where   is a car tax.  k t
This yields the following first order conditions for the consumer’s optimum 
 
(4)  ( ) 0 = + − q t p e λ ,  
(5)  () 0 = + − k k t qe δ λ .   
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Using (1), we can describe optimal fuel efficiency as a function of miles driven, prices, 














We can see that energy efficiency is higher when the cost of capital is lower.  The higher 
the fuel prices, the higher is the boost to fuel efficiency given by better capital 
equipment .  Finally, energy efficiency is higher when demand is higher for the derived 
energy services, miles driven, in the given example.   
k e
 
Introducing a demand function with constant utility of income, we obtain in addition the 
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  15Where   is the cost at which x miles are demanded, and the right hand side expression 
is the short run marginal costs.  Similarly, we will have, at the time period when capital 












) ( .   
 
Thus, when the consumer is not only in short-term equilibrium (assumedly always), but 
also in long-term equilibrium, short-run marginal costs and long-run marginal costs are 
the same.  More interesting, perhaps, is that the consumer always has a horizontal short-
run marginal cost curve, where the level represents the efficiency parameter of current 
capital equipment.  In the long term, assuming that current consumption and current prices 
represent expectations for the future as well, the consumer can choose capital equipment 
fitting those prices and annual mileage, so that the long-run marginal cost curve lies above 
the short-run marginal cost curve for lower distances, and below for higher distances.  For 
the system to be stable, the demand curve cuts both of these marginal cost curves from 
above, as illustrated in figure 3.   
 
The long-run marginal cost curve (LRMC) for miles driven, in the case of cars) will be 
declining in quantity, when higher energy efficiency can be chosen if demand for services 
is high.  When a consumer invests in equipment (a car, for instance), fuel efficiency is 
selected to ensure intersection between the demand curve d(x) and LRMC (based on 
expectations).  The short-run marginal cost curve SRMC that is thereby chosen then 







  16Figure 3: Long run marginal costs are downward sloping since fuel efficiency is 
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A fuel efficiency standard and the rebound effect  
A fuel efficiency standard, assuming it is binding, takes the choice of fuel efficiency out 
of the hands of the consumer
18.  Thus, we may study its effect on the shorter-term 
utilization decision.  Differentiating (8) w.  r.  t.  k, the capital that raises fuel efficiency, 
we have 
 
(10)   2












                                                 
18  Zachariades (2006) provides an account of developments in fuel efficiency in Europe and the USA, 
including the role of the Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency standards.  The effectiveness of the fuel 
efficency standards in reducing the average consumption in the US was jeopardized by the lax standards for 
large, heavy vehicles (SUVs), which zoomed in popularity over more than 20 years, to take 50% of the 
market.  Even this effect could probably have been prevented, or at least limited, if the good principle of 
averaging fuel economy performance across car models in the enforcement of standards had applied also 
across the boundary between SUVs and others. 
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, ε − =  
In (12), the left hand side is the proportionate change in miles associated with a 
proportionate increase in fuel efficiency.  It is intuitive that demand increases by the 
elasticity of demand for miles with respect to fuel price, since a percentage change in the 
fuel efficiency standard changes short run marginal costs in exactly the same way as does 
a percentage change in fuel prices.  This is, in terms of vehicle miles driven, what is called 
the rebound effect.  Thus, as long as the price elasticity is bound to be negative; there will 
be a rebound in terms of increased travel to fuel efficiency improvements, as here with a 
standard.   
  
In terms of miles traveled, the rebound effect can be seen in figure 3, above, by assuming 
that the consumer’s short-run marginal cost curve is shifted downward by regulatory fiat. 
The left hand part of the long-run marginal cost curve is leveled from above
19. 
 
We can now calculate the change in fuel demand; it combines the improvement in fuel 
efficiency with the increased demand for miles.  We solve (1) for q, and differentiate with 









= , which can be rearranged to 
                                                 
19 With an eye to empirical research, many studies refer to or report estimates indicating ‘low’ demand 
elasticities for transportation services, or for transportation fuels.  Nevertheless, it should be noted, a 
selection of studies that include longer term, as here with car purchases and characteristics, render demand 
elasticities in the higher end of this general population of studies.  Eskeland and Feyzioglu, incorporating car 
purchases, yield price elasticities of demand for gasoline between -.8 and -1,25, depending on model 
formulation.   
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Thus, the fuel efficiency standard translates the increase in miles driven into an increase in 
fuel demand if and only if the price elasticity of energy services, miles driven in our case, 
is lower than minus one (or higher than one in absolute value).  If the elasticity of demand 
for miles does not exceed one in absolute value, fuel consumption q is reduced even 
though there is a rebound effect in terms of miles driven.   
 
We may finally develop the relationship between the various elasticities with respect to 
gasoline price that follows from the identity 
 
(15)    ) ( ) ( p e p q x ⋅ =
 
Where we have suppressed k.  Taking the logarithm on both sides, we find 
 
(16)  p e p q p x , , , ε ε ε + =  
In the short term, when fuel efficiency does not adjust ( 0 , = p e ε ), the price elasticity of 
elasticity of fuel demand  p q, ε  equals the price elasticity of travel demand  p x, ε .  In the 
longer run, however,   
(17)  p e p x p q , , , ε ε ε − = , 
The gasoline demand elasticity  p q, ε is the travel demand elasticity  p x, ε augmented by the 
elasticity of efficiency with respect to fuel prices (the two first elasticities are negative, 
and the last is positive).  We may notice that the possibility for a rebound from the short-
term response to the long-term response is possible, but a rebound to a gasoline price 
increase is not possible even in the long term, since the long-run marginal cost curve is 




  19Observations 
o  A rebound effect in terms of increased demand for energy services (miles driven), 
is always present when a fuel efficiency standard raises fuel efficiency (assuming 
it is binding); 
o  The rebound effect can raise fuel demand when the demand elasticity of miles 
driven, with respect to costs, is greater than one in absolute value; 
o  The rebound effect can be limited or eliminated by an accompanying increase in 
fuel taxes; 
o  The sensitivity of fuel efficiency implies that the effect of fuel price changes on 
fuel demand are greater in the long term than in the short term if and only if the 
demand elasticity for energy services does not exceed one in absolute value (not 
shown).   
 
Externalities related to vehicle miles, apart from those related to gasoline consumption 
It should be mentioned that there are several types of (negative) externalities related to 
vehicle use, and only some of them are related to fuel consumption.  As has also been 
done in the literature (see, for instance, Parry, Fischer and Harrington, 2007), let us 
tentatively categorize externalities as follows: those related to fuel use include emissions 
of local air pollutants and greenhouse gases.  Also, if there are unpriced concerns about 
fuel security, these should be included as fuel related.  Let us denote the sum of fuel 
consumption related externalities by , so they are assumed proportional to fuel 
consumption.  Those related to vehicle miles include accidents, noise, road wear and 
congestion,  .  Now, we can use equations (11) and (13) to develop the change 
in external damages,   in response to a raised fuel efficiency standard: 
q d D
q q ⋅ =
x d D
x x ⋅ =
D
x q D D + =
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where the terms in the brackets represent dq and dx, respectively.  Fuel related damages 
fall as a response to the tightened standards unless it is the case that the travel demand is 
very elastic, exceeding 1 in absolute value.  Thus, the fuel related externalities will, in 
  20most cases, be reduced.  The externalities related to miles driven, in contrast, will increase, 
since the sign in the content of the second brackets will always be positive (there is always 
a rebound in demand for miles, since mileage related private marginal costs are reduced).  
It follows from this that if damages related to miles driven are significant compared to 
damages related to fuel consumption, tightened fuel efficiency standards will likely 
increase total negative externalities.   
 
The table below summarizes some studies of externalities from transport that distinguish 
externalities related to fuel use from those related to miles traveled.  It appears from these 
that two important categories of externalities related to miles driven, accidents and 
congestion, easily can be far greater than the other externalities.  This represents an a 
priori warning against programs that raise fuel efficiency standards without 
simultaneously raising fuel taxes (see below).   
 
Comparison of Externalities Associated with Fuel consumption and with miles driven 
                    Externality Due to  
 
Fuel 
Consumption*** VKM***  Ratio 
Parry, Fischer, and Harrington (2004)
* 11  2.5  4 
ECON(2003)
** Cars  0.03  0.31  10 
ECON(2003)** Goods Transport  0.04  0.20  5 
Schreyer et al.  (2004)*
   26.5 50  2 
Parry and Small(2005)*  5  17  3 
*Measured in Cents per mile.  **Measured in Øre per kilometre.  ***  See text for categorization of 









  21A fuel efficiency standard: how it relates to fuel taxation
20 
The model of optimal fuel efficiency and the possibility of a rebound effect alerts us to the 
fact that based on first principles there is nothing better than fuel taxation to reduce fuel 
consumption, or to reduce externalities that relate to fuel use, such as CO2 emissions 
(with a tax base properly scaled by fuel types).
21  
 
In part because the use of fuel taxes as a policy instrument often is politically constrained 
(Hammer et al, 2004, Buchanan and Tullock, 1974), it may be instructive to examine the 
use of fuel efficiency standards in combination with or as an alternative to fuel taxes.  In 
figure 4, below, we have demonstrated how the use of a fuel tax increase   initially 
shifts the short run marginal cost curve sharply upwards (to 
t Δ
k t srmc , (Δ ), but the shift is 
less sharp after the consumer has also adjusted the car’s efficiency ( ) ( , t k srmc( t Δ Δ ), 
according to the new long run marginal cost curve ( t lrmc Δ ( ).  In fact, when fuel 
efficiency adjusts, there is a slight ‘rebound’ in vm from a to b relative to the initial 
contraction from x* to a, but vm=b is still lower than its original value x*.  Fuel 
consumption has unequivocally contracted, since the consumer adjusts to the long run 
marginal cost curve, which has shifted outwards (not shown).   
 
Now consider, in contrast, a fuel economy standard (the lower dotted horizontal line).  
The standard has shifted down the long run marginal cost curve except when vm levels are 
                                                 
20 Accidents are very important amongst external costs of transport, and it should first be noticed that 
accidents can be responsive to many factors more well targeted than with crude instruments such as fuel 
taxes and fuel efficiency standards.  In table 1, we have assumed that accidents such as damages external to 
the driver are related to miles driven.  Kopits and Cropper (2005) analyse accidents worldwide.  An 
important debate, however, is whether policies for fuel efficiency reduce a car’s resilience towards crashes 
(thus increasing the accident internal damage to the owner) while perhaps at the same time reducing external 
damages through impacts in crashes on others (pedestrians, other cars).  We leave this topic without entering 
its details, by noticing that other instruments should be considered for this particular type of damage.   
Gordon et al (2007) analyse opportunities for fuel efficiency improvements that do not increase accidents.   
 
21  An identical argument applies in theory for emission taxes in the case of other pollutants (these emissions 
are typically less strictly proportionally linked to fuel consumption): there is nothing better than emission 
taxes based on first principles.  But for practical reasons, combinations of emission standards and fuel taxes 
can work well in that case.  An important difference between the two cases is that fuel consumption is easily 
taxed in a cumulative fashion (the tax is applied in a linear fashion, and you pay a tax on your total 
consumption), whereas for emissions of pollutants, the ‘taxman’ can easily get a measure of your emission 
rate (per gallon  or per mile), but cannot easily combine this with a measure of your cumulative gasoline 
consumption or vehicle utilization).  See Eskeland, 1994.   
  22high (where lrmc is unchanged), and vm increases due to the rebound effect.  Given the 
higher efficiency, if the standard were complemented with a fuel tax, at any level lower 
than  , the tax increase would be less painful to consumers than without the standard 
(since fuel efficiency is higher).  To bring vm to the same level b, however, the tax level 
would reach exactly the level  , so that the standard is nonbinding.  To see this, consider 
the contrary case that the standard would still be binding.  If so, fuel efficiency is ‘too 
high’ for the    tax-including fuel price, so short run marginal costs fail to be high 





Figure 4: The determination of equilibrium fuel efficiency with a fuel tax increase t Δ  
where  ≡ a ) , (
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Fuel efficiency standards and tax increases in a practical political setting 
The important insight from this model is mostly a practical one related to political 
feasibility.  One can imagine that there is political resistance (and a sensible one) to high 
or rapidly increasing fuel taxes in a setting where people depend on fuel, partly because 
  23there is a stock of fuel inefficient cars.  In such a case, if an externality related to fuel use 
requires accelerated policy reform, then fuel efficiency standards can accelerate the 
transformation of the vehicle stock towards a more efficient one.  This improvement in the 
vehicle stock will, over time, also make higher fuel taxes feasible.   
 
To illustrate this, it can be seen from (2) that the tax-including gasoline price times 
quantity   enters the consumer’s budget constraint, and that by Roy’s identity the 
effect on utility for the consumer of a small increase in the tax is 






















i.e.  the marginal utility of income times miles divided by efficiency.  Thus, if the effect 
on the consumer by a tax increase is a measure of political resistance, then the more 
efficient the car, the smaller the resistance (unless if miles demanded is price elastic 
beyond 1 in absolute value, see above).   
 
The possibility that the fuel taxes and standards work together in a dynamic political 
setting is indicated by the argument of Hammar et al.  2004, and is easily illustrated by 
equation (18).  At any point in time, if people own inefficient cars, e is low and given their 
travel needs x, they’ll resist a tax increase with a fervor indicated by (18).  Hammer et al.  
state (page 1): ‘Not only do low taxes and thus low prices encourage high consumption, 
but high levels of consumption also lead to considerable pressure against raising taxes.” If 
rational, they will also resist a plan for a future tax increase (if it could be announced in a 
credible fashion), even though a planned tax increase will give those a chance to adjust 
efficiency by planning to replace their car in the mean time.  Thus, resistance to a present 
fuel tax increase will be somewhat lower or reduced for those families who soon plan to 
replace their cars.   
 
Similarly, however, a fuel efficiency standard will immediately harm only those families 
that plan to replace their car (the fuel economy standard increases the costs of new cars).  
  24For other families, the costs of more expensive cars lie in the future, and resistance is 
reduced, at least, by their discounting of this effect
22.   
 
A possibility is that a tax increase meets excessive resistance and that a planned tax 
increase would not be credible.  When credible, the car stock would begin increasing its 
efficiency (with the rate of replacement and growth) and resistance would decline, but if it 
is not credible, efficiency does not change, and resistance to the tax increase remains 
constant
23.  A related possibility is that a fuel efficiency standard would meet little 
resistance, and that it would start changing the vehicle stock towards a more efficient one, 
and that in the process, according to (18), the fuel tax increase could be passed over time.   
 
In fact, if there is a future fuel cost increase, then the social costs of that increase are lower 
if it can be expected, lending support to anything that makes policy more strategic and 
predictable.  
 
The possibility exists, thus, that the use of fuel efficiency standards and fuel taxes over 
time can make feasible not only a car stock that is more efficient than what fuel taxes 
could achieve alone, but that society would save on car use and use-dependent 
externalities because higher fuel taxes are made politically feasible with more efficient 
cars.   
 
We should mention the important possibility, too, that in the course of such a combined 
program, society both employs more fuel efficient cars and economizes on their use while 
the (path of) fuel efficiency standards never become very constraining for consumers.  
The reason lies in the observation above, that the tax rate which eliminates the rebound 
effect indeed is the tax rate at which the efficiency standard is not binding.  Thus, if one 
thinks of fuel efficiency standards as moving forward along a path mainly to make higher 
                                                 
22 In fact, there will also be capital gains for used cars when regulations make new cars more expensive, and 
cars will, for this reason, live longer (Kahn, 1986), but we may distract from this in the present treatment.   
23 Those familiar with the literature will recognize the problem of time consistency, pointed out by Kydland 
and Prescott, 1977.  If the planned tax increase could be made credible, for instance, by a rule agreed in an 
international treaty, the problem would be solved.  The fuel efficiency standard, we surmize here, might work 
as a commitment device. 
  25fuel taxes acceptable and thus credible, then the departure from first principles may indeed 
be minor, at least in the sense that the important role of the price instrument as a rationing 
device is retained.   
 
Sunk costs in technology investments, fuel economy standards, and international 
coordination 
We have shown the possibility that future fuel tax increases are discounted too heavily by 
consumers, either because consumers are myopic, liquidity constrained, or rationally 
expect that government cannot follow up on announced policies.  Car makers and others 
who might invest in more efficient future car technology will, similarly, have too low 
incentives to do so, if they do not believe fuel taxes will be raised as announced (this 
argument is developed in greater detail in Montgomery and Smith, 2004, and Alfsen and 
Eskeland, 2007).   
 
If investments in new and low-carbon technologies have a characteristic of sunk costs, 
then indeed it is the case that a technology developed to abate emissions of carbon – once 
it has been developed – will be marketed even if (fuel and) emission taxes turn out lower 
than those that had to be promised to stimulate its development.  In other words, if the 
government promises you future fuel taxes at a certain level in order for you to develop a 
certain energy efficient technology, it could be rational for government to implement 
lower taxes than promised if and when you have succeeded.  So, you will have taxes high 
enough to sell your goods, but not high enough to reward you fully for your past 
investment efforts.  This reasoning, of course, raises doubts that expected taxes can 
provide the stimuli for technological change and other long term investments that are 
needed for challenges such as the global climate.   
 
The question then arises whether commitment mechanisms exist, and it is possible to be 
very pessimistic about this.  A consequence could be that the tax levels that need to be 
expected for the problem of global warming to be solved cannot be expected by rational 
consumers and producers.  Within these contexts, however, one could argue that fuel 
economy standards set many years in advance can be credible.  If a city could announce 
  26that buses for concessions from 2020 onwards would need to satisfy a certain fuel 
economy standard that is now almost inconceivable, perhaps it would not be credible.  If a 
country or a group of countries announced the same, perhaps it could be credible.  Indeed, 
California has been successful in pushing the car industry towards lower emission 
standards in terms of traditional (local) air pollutants.  A list of tentative reasons for 
California’s success should include: i) the California market is large enough to be 
attractive to car makers; ii) standards have been successful when set high, but realistically; 
iii) California does not have its own car industry, so political resistance from industry has 
been modest; iv) California has a rich and educated population genuinely concerned about 
air pollution, thus providing support for policies being maintained, rather than the reverse, 
when under pressure.   
 
The first of these items indicate, of course, that an initiative that is not credible and thus 
not effective if launched by an individual jurisdiction, could be effective if launched at a 
higher jurisdictional level (federal, say) or by countries in coordination.  
 
Heterogenous consumers, and three smart variations on a theme 
In reality, of course, consumers do not have the same exact needs. Some households would 
use their car to travel little, others more; some would need weight and carrying capacity, 
others a small vehicle for two person in their commute. A sensible way to account for this 
is to let a fuel efficiency standard be averaged – or traded – across a larger population of 
cars. This was the essential spirit of the USA’s corporate average fuel efficiency standard. 
In effect, the averaging standard changes relative prices so as to make the more efficient 
cars more attractive both to producers and to consumers. It is as if a fuel-inefficient car is 
taxed at the point of purchase, and the revenues are being used to subsidize the more 
efficient ones. As mentioned earlier, the scheme had important flaws in its implementation, 
but the essential idea was a good one. Presently, the EU is discussing CO2 standards for 
cars in the range of 120 to 130 grams per vehicle kilometer, and it will probably be 
implemented with a kind of averaging, though with lessons from CAFÉ. An alternative 
approach is pursued in Norway’s 2007 formula for taxes on new cars, with its explicit 
taxation of the model’s certified CO2 emissions per vehicle kilometer.  
  27 
These instruments have in common with the simple model of a fuel economy standard that 
they supplement fuel taxes in an attempt to modify the characteristics of the vehicle stock, 
and that they do this by shifting the characteristics of new cars being sold. They do 
influence both each vehicle model and the sales composition, via a range of responses on 
an axis from university researchers and car developers through the household’s car 
purchase decisions. By influencing the entering vehicle stock in a direction of fuel 
efficiency, average fuel dependency will decline, this will be expected, and this allows 
higher fuel taxes to be expected.  
 
V. Conclusions and Recommendations  
We have used a simple model to guide a discussion of how fuel taxes and fuel economy 
standards can or should be used together if policy objectives – externalities – relate fairly 
closely with fuel consumption.  It is solidly based in simple welfare economics that fuel 
taxes alone can do a very good job in addressing such objectives, a class that should 
include concerns of security of oil supply (for importing countries) as well as greenhouse 
gas emission reductions.   
 
In basic theoretical terms fuel taxes take a supreme role as a policy instrument because 
they leave it open to the consumer whether to reduce consumption by acquiring more fuel 
efficient cars or by using the car less.  For fuel efficiency standards, in contrast, the policy 
maker prejudges the role that should be played by improved fuel efficiency, and to some 
extent forces this judgment on the market as a whole.  If the standard fails to be 
accompanied by fuel taxes, there will be a rebound in travel once people have lower 
operating costs, and perhaps increased external costs of travel associated with this rebound.   
 
The case that can be made for fuel efficiency standards requires more elements than those 
employed in the basic model, and typically one draws on a number of arguments that are 
related.  An essential feature is that capital goods, such as cars, last a long time, so if 
consumers and producers pay enough attention to fuel efficiency, they must do so in a 
setting where they understand the difference between available cars and value the 
  28differences in terms of future fuel savings appropriately.  Analysts and regulators have 
addressed both the information issue (labeling standards and certification standards) and 
the issue of whether consumers discount too heavily future fuel savings of more efficient 
vehicles, either because they are financially constrained or because they behave myopically.  
Of course, if buyers do not sufficiently value the expected fuel savings of more efficient 
cars, producers and inventors will also spend too little on developing them, even if it fuels 
are taxed at appropriate levels.   
 
We bring in the additional question of whether, for policy instruments such as fuel taxes, 
governments are unable to convey, with sufficient strength and credibility, a path of high 
or increasing fuel taxes in the future.  Of course, if car purchases and car efficiency 
inventions are to be optimal, consumers must base their investments on expected fuel taxes, 
and producers on their beliefs of peoples’ expectations.  In brief, without fuel economy 
standards, if the government cannot credibly raise expected fuel prices to the level it would 
prefer, then cars will be sub optimally fuel efficient.   
 
An additional case for fuel efficiency standards is therefore made if the government with 
these can raise the fuel economy to a path where it would have been if a desirable path of 
future fuel taxes could be committed to and conveyed credibly.  As it happens, if people 
are pushed to buy more efficient cars, then tomorrow they’ll have more efficient cars than 
they otherwise would, and this can reduce the political resistance to higher fuel taxes.  If, 
in addition, an announced path of future fuel efficiency standards can be credible, then this 
announced path could raise not only fuel efficiency as it is purchased by consumers (and 
firms and cities) today, but also raise  research and development on how to attain higher 
efficiency in the future.  Graph 2 demonstrates that many jurisdictions have decided on 
fuel economy standards well in advance.   
 
It would not be mere speculation, thus, to state that the case for fuel economy standards 
rests on difficult challenges of relating policy measures today to the influence of 
expectations about the future.  Importantly, it also rests on working together with fuel taxes, 
  29since it is well demonstrated in theory and practice that fuel efficiency standards can be 
directly harmful if applied alone.   
 
It is tempting to add, once one has accepted that we can meet policy goals more effectively 
if we can signal future policies more credibly, that international coordination is indicated 
as a promising proposition, and for several reasons.  First, if there are scale economy issues 
in technological development, a firm would invest more to meet the standard in a larger 
market than in a smaller one, so tougher future standards would be credible if applied to 
more countries (greater markets, more accurately).  Second, if collusion against the 
regulator is part of the threat to credibility, then the threat is smaller in a larger market (see 
literature on regulatory capture, highlighting the danger of regulators being too 
understanding of the industry).  Thirdly, international treaties may make policies more 
credible through institutional rigor.   
 
These propositions should not be seen as merely speculative, but rather indicating that 
economists should not be as puzzled by the presence of fuel economy standards as the 
literature has tended to imply.  Apart from that, we believe future research should focus on 
the possible case for international coordination and on the payoffs of technological 
research to make cars more fuel and/or emission effective.  It may appear that 
technological development does not get the attention it deserves in this area, and if so a 
range of policy instruments should be considered.  But the possibility that expected future 
fuel prices and emission costs will be too low allows for the possibility that simple policies 
such as R&D programs and future standards – and perhaps internationally coordinated – 
could play a role.   
 
Maybe the case for standards is strong without international coordination, but it is possible 
that this would add potential without costing too much.  At least for a small country, the 
prospects are slim that you can influence car makers and inventors unless you move in a 
pack with others.  For makers and inventors, surely, it could be more tempting to invest in 
a particular direction for the long term, as large markets have signaled firmly an interest for 
such a direction.   
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  33Annex: Illustrations with Cross Country Data 
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Figure A2: Plotting vehicle stock fuel use (per 100 km) against income per capita (IEA 
and OECD data).  
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Figure A3: Fuel use of new car sales plotted against income per capita. 
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Figure A4: How weight and income per capita has evolved in the 
OECD






































Figure A5: Average, for new vehicles sold, of weight and fuel use (for the US, by two 
vehicle categories).  
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FigureA6:  Fuel use per 100 km for the car fleet average 
















































  36Figure A7:  Fuel use per 100 km for new cars and light duty trucks, average, IEA data, 
plotted against fuel price (averaged over fuel types). 
 























































Source: IEA and OECD data 
Figure A2-4: Average, for new vehicles sold, of weight and fuel use (for the US, by two 
vehicle categories).  
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